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The Moral Divide Between High- and Low-Status Animals:
The Role of Human Supremacy Beliefs
Victoria C. Krings, Kristof Dhont, and Alina Salmen
School of Psychology, Keynes College, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK
ABSTRACT
People endorsing stronger beliefs in human supremacy over
animals typically show less moral concern for animals. Yet, how
people think about different types of animals also depends on
the role of the animals in society. For instance, people are less
concerned about food animals than about companion animals. It
is unclear, however, how human supremacy beliefs relate to this
perceived moral divide between different types of animals. In two
surveys of British adults (n = 196 and n = 256), we tested whether
human supremacy beliefs are associated with a greater perceived
moral divide between high-status animals such as companion
animals and low-status animals such as food animals. In both
studies, participants rated the extent to which they felt obligated
to show moral concern to a range of animals and completed the
human supremacy beliefs scale. As expected, the results showed
that participants felt more moral concern for companion animals
(e.g., dogs and cats) and appealing wild animals (e.g., dolphins
and chimps) than for food animals (e.g., pigs and turkeys) and
unappealing wild animals (e.g., frogs and bats). Critically,
confirming our hypotheses, this moral divide between high- and
low-status animals was significantly larger for those holding
stronger human supremacy beliefs. Furthermore, the effect of
human supremacy beliefs remained after controlling for gender,
age, diet, and social dominance orientation. These findings
suggest that beliefs in human supremacy over animals may serve
as a legitimizing strategy to preserve not only the existing







Animals come in many shapes – some are cute and fluffy, some elicit disgust, and some
are considered the perfect lunch. We love our companion animals, considering them part
of the family, yet eat farmed animals (Bastian & Loughnan, 2016; Joy, 2010; Loughnan
et al., 2014) and recoil at the thought of wild animals linked to disease or danger
(Herzog, 2010; Piazza et al., 2014). These differences between nonhuman animal cat-
egories are also reflected in the extent to which people care morally about different
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animals. People attribute different moral value to different animals based solely on their
species membership, even if these animals have comparable mental and emotional capa-
bilities (e.g., dogs and pigs). The differential treatment and moral valuation of animals
have been observed across various contexts (Caviola et al., 2020; Herzog, 2010; Joy,
2010) and described as an expression of speciesism by scholars in philosophy (e.g.,
Horta, 2010; Singer, 1995) and psychology (e.g., Caviola et al., 2019; Caviola & Capraro,
2020; Dhont et al., 2020; Plous, 2003). We refer to this difference in attributed moral
status between different animals as the moral divide. For instance, Leite et al. (2019)
demonstrated that people show much less moral concern for low-status animals such
as food animals (e.g., pigs) and unappealing wild animals (e.g., snakes) than for high-
status animals such as companion animals (e.g., dogs) and appealing wild animals (e.g.,
dolphins and chimps) (see also Bratanova et al., 2011; Leach et al., 2021; Piazza, 2020).
Although the tendency to value some animals over others has been intensively discussed
by philosophers and animal rights advocates, the psychological factors that are poten-
tially related to this phenomenon have received only scant research attention in the
psychological literature.
Moral concern for animals is not only shaped by the animals’ socially constructed
classifications, but also driven by stable individual difference variables (Dhont et al.,
2020; Dhont & Hodson, 2014; Loughnan et al., 2014). Specifically, the extent to which
people believe that humans are inherently superior to other animals (i.e., human supre-
macy beliefs) is related to a greater acceptance of using animals for a wide range of prac-
tices, including industrial factory farming, breeding animals for their skin (e.g., fur coats),
and the use of animals for entertainment (e.g., circus, rodeos) and cosmetic testing
(Caviola et al., 2019; Dhont & Hodson, 2014). Dhont and Hodson (2014) argued that
this belief in human supremacy serves as a legitimizing strategy to preserve and
enhance hierarchy in human–animal relations and allows individuals to exclude all
types of animals from moral circles (see also Leite et al., 2019). Indeed, if animals are con-
sidered inherently inferior to humans, then it is easier to justify the continued consump-
tion of animal products and the use of animals for human benefits (Dhont et al., 2020;
Dhont & Hodson, 2014).
It is presently unclear, however, whether human supremacy beliefs also relate to a
greater perceived moral divide between different animal categories. The central hypoth-
esis tested in the present research is that those who more strongly endorse human supre-
macy beliefs will make greater moral distinctions between low- and high-status animals
when indicating their moral concern for animals. Indeed, although previous research
shows that human supremacy beliefs longitudinally predict lower moral concern for
both low- and high-status animals (Leite et al., 2019), we expected that human supremacy
beliefs would be more strongly associated with moral concern for low-status animals than
moral concern for high-status animals, thereby further increasing the moral divide
between low- and high-status animals.
Drawing on theorizing and findings from research on human intergroup relations, it is
well-established that those strongly driven by motives of power and group-based domi-
nance (i.e., those higher on social dominance orientation, SDO) express greater prejudice
toward low-status and disadvantaged human outgroups and endorse hierarchy-enhan-
cing legitimizing myths (e.g., holding racist or sexist views) to preserve and enhance
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existing social hierarchies (Hodson et al., 2010; Kteily et al., 2012; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
Moreover, people higher on SDO not only tend to justify inequality in human intergroup
relations, they are alsomore likely to hold speciesist attitudes (e.g., Dhont et al., 2014, 2016)
and to justify or rationalize the consumption and exploitation of animals, for example, by
denying the cognitive and emotional capabilities of farmed animals or focusing on the pre-
sumed normality or necessity of eating or harming animals (e.g., Hyers, 2006; Jackson &
Gibbings, 2016; Piazza et al., 2015). In other words, desires for group-based dominance
and inequality are implicated in people’s prejudiced attitudes and behaviors both
toward human and nonhuman social groups, with SDO underpinning both types of
biases (Dhont et al., 2014; Dhont et al., 2016; Jackson, 2019; Salmen & Dhont, 2020).
Extending the scope of this research line, Jackson (2019) investigated the associations
between SDO, speciesism, and attitudes toward a wide range of human social groups in
two samples of university students. The findings showed that higher levels of speciesism
are associated with more negative attitudes toward low-status and hierarchy-attenuating
groups (e.g., disabled people) but not with attitudes toward high-status or hierarchy-
enhancing groups (e.g., bankers). Furthermore and in line with previous research, SDO
explained the relation between speciesism and negative attitudes toward low-status
and hierarchy-attenuating groups, confirming its role as the common ideological root
of biases in human intergroup and human–animal relations (Dhont et al., 2016).
However, whereas SDO refers to general desires for group-based dominance in human
intergroup relations, we focused specifically on desires for dominance over nonhuman
animals (rather than humans): human supremacy beliefs. In other words, the construct
of human supremacy beliefs is theoretically parallel to SDO and both constructs are sig-
nificantly, positively correlated (e.g., Dhont & Hodson, 2014), yet given the current focus
on status differences between animal categories, human supremacy beliefs is arguably a
more proximal variable. Indeed, if the endorsement of human supremacy beliefs functions
as a strategy to maintain and enhance the status hierarchy between different groups of
animals, then higher levels of human supremacy beliefs can be expected to be particularly
related to lower moral concern for low-status animals, akin to how SDO is primarily related
to prejudice toward human low-status groups.
Across two studies, we extended this growing body of research by investigating the
associations between human supremacy beliefs and moral concern for different animal
groups. Specifically, we presented participants with a list of animals belonging to low-
status groups (i.e., food animals in studies 1 and 2, and also unappealing wild animals
in study 2) and high-status groups (companion animals and appealing wild animals in
studies 1 and 2), and asked them to rate how much moral concern they feel compelled
to show each animal. In line with previous research (e.g., Leite et al., 2019), we expected
that participants would show higher levels of moral concern for animals belonging to a
high-status category than for animals belonging to a low-status category. Furthermore,
we expected an interaction effect between animal category and human supremacy
beliefs on moral concern for animals such that, although human supremacy beliefs
would be associated with lower levels of moral concern for all animal categories, this
effect was expected to be stronger for low-status than for high-status animal categories.
As a result, a greater perceivedmoral divide between low- and high-status animals among
those higher on human supremacy beliefs was expected.
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Study 1
The aim of study 1 was to test the hypotheses in a heterogeneous sample of British adults.
We focused on the moral divide between food animals, which are typically attributed a
lower status, and two high-status animal categories, namely, companion animals and
appealing wild animals.
Methods
Ethical approval to conduct this study was given by the research ethics committee at
the authors’ institution and all participants provided informed consent electronically
before taking part. The sample consisted of 196 British Prolific Academic participants
(Mage = 35.4 years, SD = 12.8; 30.1% male, 68.9% female, 1% identified as transgen-
der/other) who completed an online survey including measures of human supremacy
beliefs, moral concern for animals and demographics. Most participants self-identified
as meat eaters (72.4%), 14.8% as flexitarians, 2.6% as pescatarians, 7.1% as vegetarians,
2.6% as vegans, and the remaining 0.5% identified as other. A sensitivity
analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2009), assuming α = 0.05 and 95% power, indicated
that the weakest effect size detectable with this sample size was f = 0.09 (i.e., a small
effect).
Respondents completed the 6-item human supremacy beliefs scale (1, strongly dis-
agree; 7, strongly agree; Dhont & Hodson, 2014). To measure moral concern for
animals, we presented a written list of 15 animal names, all on the same page in a
randomized order, including (1) companion animals: dog, cat, horse; (2) food
animals: pig, cow, chicken, turkey, sheep, duck; and (3) appealing wild animals:
chimp, kangaroo, dolphin, bear, lion (see also Leite et al., 20191; based on Laham,
2009). Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they felt morally obligated
to show concern for each animal on 7-point scales (1, Not at all; 7, Very much so).
Following Leite et al. (2019), we calculated an average score of moral concern for
each animal category. Correlations, means, standard deviations, and scale reliability
scores are reported in Table 1. The data and materials of this study are available
via the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/7hb8z/.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, scale reliabilities, and zero-order correlations between moral concern
for different animals, human supremacy beliefs, and demographic variables in study 1.
M SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Food animals 4.47 1.71 0.98 – 0.70** 0.64** –0.48** 0.16* 0.09 0.34**
2. Companion animals 5.49 1.26 0.81 – 0.77** –0.40** 0.16* –0.01 0.23**
3. Appealing wild animals 5.38 1.35 0.94 – –0.35** 0.14* 0.06 0.21**
4. Human supremacy beliefs 3.51 1.30 0.90 – –0.20** 0.08 –0.34**
5. Gender – – – –0.01 0.17*
6. Age 35.40 12.83 – 0.04
7. Diet 1.52 1.02 –
Note: Gender 1 = Male, 2 = Female; Diet ranges from 1 (Meat Eater) to 5 (Vegan).
*p < 0.05.
**p < 0.001.
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Results
First, we tested whether moral concern for animals significantly differed between
animal categories. A repeated measures ANOVA showed significant differences
between moral concern for the three animal categories (F(1.69, 329.34) = 90.39, p <
0.001, h2p = 0.317).
2 Participants showed greater moral concern for companion and
appealing wild animals than for food animals (F(1, 195) = 135.84, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.411
and F(1, 195) = 91.00, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.318) (see Table 1 for Ms and SDs). Moral concern
for appealing wild and companion animals did not significantly differ from each
other (F(1, 195) = 3.17, p = 0.076, h2p = 0.016).
Next, we tested the hypothesis that human supremacy beliefs moderate the effect
of animal category on moral concern for animals by including human supremacy
beliefs as a continuous predictor of moral concern for animals in the repeated
measures ANOVA. The results revealed a significant interaction between human
supremacy beliefs and animal category (F(1.730, 335.69) = 11.84, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.058
(see note 2)), indicating that the moral divide between categories depended on
human supremacy beliefs. Specifically, human supremacy beliefs moderated the
moral divide between companion and food animals (F(1, 194) = 14.65, p < 0.001, h2p =
0.070), and between appealing wild and food animals (F(1, 194) = 15.04, p < 0.001, h2p
= 0.072). However, human supremacy beliefs did not moderate the moral divide
between the two high-status animal categories: appealing wild vs. companion
animals (F(1, 194) = 0.25, p = 0.615, h2p = 0.001).
To further decompose and understand the significant interaction effects, we con-
ducted a moderation analysis for within-subjects designs using the MEMORE macro for
SPSS (Montoya, 2019). Specifically, extending the analytic procedures proposed by
Judd et al. (2001), MEMORE allowed us to test and probe the effect of animal category
(i.e., the within-subjects factor) on moral concern for animals at high (+1 SD) and low
(–1 SD) levels of human supremacy beliefs (i.e., the moderator). The results of these ana-
lyses are reported in Table 2 and presented in Figure 1. Corroborating our hypothesis,
both those higher and lower on human supremacy beliefs indicated to feel less moral
concern for food animals than for companion animals and for appealing wild animals,
yet this perceived moral divide was significantly larger for those higher on human supre-
macy beliefs. In other words, those with stronger beliefs in human supremacy over
animals perceived larger differences between high- and low-status animal categories in
terms of their moral status.
Furthermore, in line with our expectations, the results revealed that human supremacy
beliefs predicted lower levels of moral concern for all animal categories, yet this effect was
particularly pronounced for food animals (b = –0.64, SE = 0.08, t(194) = –7.70, p < 0.001, 95%
CI [–0.80, –0.47]). Human supremacy beliefs also predicted lower moral concern for com-
panion animals (b = –0.39, SE = 0.06, t(194) = –6.02, p < 0.001, 95% CI [–0.51, –0.26]) and
appealing wild animals, (b = –0.36, SE = 0.07, t(194) = –5.17, p < 0.001, 95% CI [–0.50, –
0.22]), yet these latter associations were significantly weaker than the association
between human supremacy beliefs and food animals (b = 0.25, SE = 0.07, t(194) = 3.83,






























































































































































































































































































































































6 V. C. KRINGS ET AL.
Finally, to check the robustness of these findings, we tested the interaction effects
again but additionally considered the demographic variables that were significantly
correlated with any of the key variables of interest. Specifically, both gender and
diet were significantly related to the moral concern variables and human supremacy
beliefs, and thus we included these variables as additional predictors to adjust for
their possible confounding influence. However, this did not meaningfully change
the pattern of results; both human supremacy beliefs × animal category interaction
effects were still significant (b = 0.19, SE = 0.07, t(189) = 2.73, p = 0.007, 95% CI [0.05,
0.33] when considering companion vs. food animals, and b = 0.22, SE = 0.07, t(189) =
2.89, p = 0.004, 95% CI [0.07, 0.38] when considering wild appealing vs. food
animals).3
Study 2
The aim of study 2 was to replicate and extend the findings of study 1 by testing whether
similar patterns would occur when including non-food animals holding a low status.
Specifically, we additionally included unappealing wild animals such as snakes and bats
as a separate low-status group (Leite et al., 2019). Furthermore, given the pronounced
associations between SDO and human supremacy beliefs (e.g., Dhont & Hodson, 2014;
Salmen & Dhont, 2020), we statistically controlled for SDO to demonstrate the unique
role of human supremacy beliefs in predicting the moral divide between high- and
low-status animal groups.
Figure 1.Moral concern ratings as a function of animal category at low (–1 SD) and high (+1 SD) levels
of human supremacy beliefs (study 1).
ANTHROZOÖS 7
Methods
Ethical approval to conduct this study was given by the research ethics committee at
the authors’ institution and all participants provided informed consent electronically
before taking part. Respondents were 254 British Prolific Academic participants4
(Mage = 31.2, SD = 10.6; 44.1% female), who completed the relevant measures in an
online survey, with 80.7% self-identified as omnivores, 11.8% as flexitarians, 1.6% as
pescatarians, 3.5% as vegetarians, 1.6% as vegans, and the remaining 0.8% as other.
A sensitivity analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2009), assuming α = 0.05 and 95%
power, indicated that the weakest effect size detectable with this sample size was f
= 0.09 (i.e., a small effect).
We measured human supremacy beliefs and moral concern for companion animals,
food animals and appealing wild animals in a similar way as in study 1, and we added
several animals belonging to the category of unappealing wild animals to the list of
animals (i.e., bat, snake, snail, and frog) in the moral concern measure (see note 1). As
in the first study, the list of animals was presented on one page in a randomized order.
We also measured SDO with the short, 8-item measure (1, strongly disagree; 7, strongly
agree) developed by Ho et al. (2015). For all correlations, means, standard deviations,
and scale reliability scores, see Table 3. The data and materials of this study are available
via the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/7hb8z/.
Results
Replicating study 1, a repeatedmeasures ANOVA confirmed that the moral concern scores
varied significantly between the categories (F(2.18, 553.54) = 225.16, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.471)
(see note 2). Participants showed greater moral concern for companion and appealing
wild animals than for food animals (F(1, 253) = 179.02, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.414 and F(1, 253) =
63.81, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.201). Moral concern was also higher for companion and appealing
wild animals than for unappealing wild animals (F(1, 253) = 340.47, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.574 and
F(1, 253) = 341.06, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.574). Furthermore, participants showed greater moral
concern for food animals than for unappealing wild animals (F(1,253) = 156.26, p < 0.001,
h2p = 0.382), and greater concern for companion than for appealing wild animals (F(1,
253) = 50.15, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.165).
Next, testing the moderating role of human supremacy beliefs yielded a significant
interaction between human supremacy beliefs and animal category (F(2.24, 564.64) =
11.87, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.045) (see note 2). Specifically, human supremacy beliefs signifi-
cantly moderated the moral divide between companion and food animals and
between companion and unappealing wild animals (F(1, 252) = 18.30, p < 0.001, h2p =
0.068 and F(1, 252) = 16.28, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.061). Furthermore, human supremacy beliefs
also moderated the moral divide between appealing wild and food animals (F(1, 252) =
9.36, p = 0.002, h2p = 0.036) and between appealing wild animals and unappealing wild
animals (F(1, 252) = 15.86, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.059). However, human supremacy beliefs did
not moderate the moral divide between the two high-status animal categories: appealing
wild vs. companion animals (F(1, 252) = 2.49, p = 0.116, h2p = 0.010); nor between the two
low-status animal categories: food animals vs. unappealing wild animals (F(1, 252) = 2.04,
p = 0.154, h2p = 0.008).





































































































































































































































































































































































































To further decompose these interaction patterns, we conducted a moderation analysis
for within-subjects designs (using MEMORE for SPSS; Montoya, 2019) and tested the effect
of animal category on moral concern for animals at high (+1 SD) and low (– 1 SD) levels of
human supremacy beliefs. The results of these analyses are reported in Table 4 and pre-
sented in Figure 2. Replicating the findings of study 1, both those higher and lower on
human supremacy beliefs indicated to feel less moral concern for food animals than for
companion animals and for appealing wild animals, yet this perceived moral divide was
significantly stronger for those higher (vs. lower) on human supremacy beliefs. Extending
the findings of study 1, both those higher and lower on human supremacy beliefs felt less
moral concern for unappealing wild animals than for companion animals and for appeal-
ing wild animals, yet again, this perceivedmoral divide was significantly stronger for those
higher (vs. lower) on human supremacy beliefs. Taken together, those with stronger
human supremacy beliefs perceived a larger moral divide between high- and low-
status animal categories.
Furthermore, replicating the results of study 1, human supremacy beliefs showed
pronounced associations with lower levels of moral concern for low-status animals (i.e.,
for food animals, b = –0.45, SE = 0.06, t(252) = –7.35, p < 0.001, 95% CI [–0.57, –0.33]; and
for unappealing wild animals, b = –0.54, SE = 0.08, t(252) = –6.99, p < 0.001, 95% CI [–0.69,
–0.39]). Moreover, human supremacy beliefs also predicted lower moral concern for
high-status animals (i.e., for companion animals, b = –0.21, SE = 0.05, t(252) = –4.42, p <
0.001, 95% CI [–0.31, –0.12]; and for appealing wild animals, b = –0.29, SE = 0.05, t(252) = –
5.29, p < 0.001, 95% CI [–0.39, –0.18]), yet the significant interaction terms (see Table 4)
Figure 2.Moral concern ratings as a function of animal category at low (–1 SD) and high (+1 SD) levels
of human supremacy beliefs (study 2).


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































indicated that the associations for the low-status animal categorieswere significantly stron-
ger than the associations for the high-status animal categories.
Finally, as a robustness check, we conducted the same analyses again with the
additional inclusion of SDO, gender, and diet as predictors of moral concern because
these variables were significantly correlated with the key variables of interest (i.e., see
Table 3). Adjusting for the variance explained by SDO, gender, and diet did not meaning-
fully change the pattern of results. All expected interaction effects remained significant,
with significant differences between the effects of human supremacy beliefs on moral
concern for companion vs. food animals (b = 0.22, SE = 0.06, t(240) = 3.47, p < 0.001, 95%
CI [0.09, 0.34]), moral concern for companion vs. unappealing animals (b = 0.24, SE =
0.09, t(240) = 2.61, p = 0.010, 95% CI [0.06, 0.42]), moral concern for appealing wild vs
food animals (b = 0.19, SE = 0.06, t(240) = 3.14, p = 0.002, 95% CI [0.07, 0.31]), and moral
concern for appealing wild animals vs. unappealing wild animals (b = 0.21, SE = 0.07,
t(240) = 2.94, p = 0.004, 95% CI [0.07, 0.35]) (see note 3).
Discussion
Whether people care morally for animals varies widely between species and is directly
linked to how the animals are typically treated and (de)valued in society (Dhont et al.,
2020; Herzog, 2010; Joy, 2010; Leite et al., 2019; Plous, 2003). Across two heterogeneous
British samples, we confirmed that most people care a great deal about the welfare and
interests of companion animals and some wild animals, but significantly less about food
animals and unappealing wild animals, replicating the findings of Leite et al. (2019) from
the USA. Moreover, we revealed that these perceived moral divisions between high-status
and low-status animal categories were greater for those holding stronger beliefs in
human supremacy over animals. These findings were demonstrated after controlling
for gender, diet, and SDO, highlighting the critical role of individual differences in
human supremacy beliefs in relation to how people think morally about animals. More
specifically, similar to how preferences for dominance and inequality in human intergroup
relations is primarily related to greater negativity and lower concerns for human low-
status groups, our findings showed that preferences for dominance and inequality in
human–animal relations were primarily related to lower moral concern for low-status
groups. Consistent with our theorizing, the present findings thus suggest that human
supremacy beliefs may operate as a hierarchy-enhancing motive to preserve hierarchical
distinctions between animals.
Several psychological processes may explain why those higher on human supremacy
beliefs perceive a greater moral divide between high- and low-status animal categories.
Indeed, past research has identified a myriad of psychological strategies that enable
people to justify the lack of concern for the welfare and interests of certain animals but
not others (e.g., Piazza, 2020; Rothgerber, 2020). For example, a series of studies has
demonstrated that people tend to perceive food animals as lacking certain mental
capacities, often denying the animals’ intellectual abilities (i.e., capacity for agency/think-
ing) and their ability to experience or feel emotions (e.g., Bilewicz et al., 2011; Bratanova
et al., 2011; Loughnan et al., 2010). In contrast to food animals, companion animals such as
cats and dogs, and certain wild animals such as wolves and pandas, are perceived as
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highly intelligent and sentient (e.g., Possidónio et al., 2019). These perceptions of animals’
mental sophistications or the lack thereof have direct implications for people’s judgement
of animals’moral standing. Indeed, people rely on intelligence and sentience information
to make moral judgements and attribute moral value to individuals (e.g., Bastian et al.,
2012; Gray et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2021). Dementalizing food animals makes it easier
not to care morally for them, which in turn helps to justify harming or eating them
(e.g., Bastian et al., 2012; Hodson et al., 2014; Piazza et al., 2014). Motivated by desires
to keep low-status animal groups at the bottom of the moral hierarchy, those higher
on human supremacy beliefs may be more strongly motivated to engage in such justifi-
cation strategies. This could in turn explain the differential ratings of moral concern
between food animals and high-status animals.
Furthermore, those higher on human supremacy beliefs may be motivated to exagger-
ate or may be more sensitive to the undesired or negative characteristics of low-status
wild animals. Specifically, companion animals and high-status wild animals are considered
cuter and more similar to humans than low-status animals (e.g., snakes), whereas low-
status wild animals are considered more harmful or disgusting. Previous research has
shown that these dimensions of perceived harmfulness, repulsiveness, and dissimilarity
to humans are all associated with lower moral standing and decreased desires to care
for or protect the animals (Knight, 2008; Piazza et al., 2014; Possidónio et al., 2019). To
maintain and enhance the animal hierarchy and to dominate low-status animals
especially, those higher on human supremacy beliefs may be more inclined to perceive
negative or undesirable features of these animals, which would explain why they show
a greater moral divide between unappealing wild animals and high-status animals.
Future research could examine the psychological processes underpinning the observed
patterns by investigating whether those higher in human supremacy beliefs are more
likely to dementalize low-status animals or show a greater attentional focus on negative
characteristics of these animals.
Furthermore, due to the cross-sectional research design, our findings cannot speak to
the causal directions of the relationships. Moreover, while the zero-order correlations in
the study of Leite et al. (2019) showed a similar pattern of results as in the current
studies (i.e., weaker associations of human supremacy beliefs with moral concern for com-
panion animals than for food and unappealing wild animals), the longitudinal effects of
human supremacy beliefs on moral inclusion of animals did not seem to substantially
differ across animal categories. To further investigate this issue, future research could
experimentally manipulate the perceived gap between animals and humans, for instance
by describing animals as more similar to humans (e.g., Bastian et al., 2012). Closing this
human–animal divide could not only increase moral concern toward animals, but it
may also help in closing the moral divide between different animals by increasing
moral concern toward low-status animals in particular.
To conclude, the present research provides further evidence for the role of human
supremacy beliefs in people’s moral thinking about animals and their considerations of
which animals are valued or devalued. Specifically, our findings suggest that human
supremacy beliefs may serve as a legitimizing motivation not only to preserve hierarchy
in human–animal relations but also to maintain and enhance hierarchical and moral
divides between different animal categories.
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Notes
1. These animal categories are based on previous research, with factor analyses supporting
these categorizations (Leite et al., 2019).
2. F-test results of the main effect of animal category are estimates adjusted for lack of sphericity
using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction. Indeed, Mauchly’s test for sphericity indicated that
sphericity had been violated, potentially inflating the F-value if not corrected for. The Green-
house-Geisser correction is robust to violations of sphericity and applies a correction to the
degrees of freedom, leading to a valid F-ratio (e.g., Abdi, 2010).
3. Given that gender and diet were included as control variable in these analyses, only the data
of those participants who indicated to belong to the gender category of men or women, and
only those who did not indicate “other” as dietary category, were included in these analyses.
Based on these criteria, the data of three participants were excluded from these additional
analyses in study 1, and the data of nine participants were excluded from these additional
analyses in study 2.
4. Two participants were excluded due to incomplete data.
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